

10 February 1981

25X1

NOTE FOR:



Jack:

The transition team's paper doesn't carry a classification. But Siegel thinks it should be "confidential" because that is the classification of a recent covering memo from Under Secretary Buckley to Haig. The covering memo stated that Buckley would be using the transition team's paper as a basis for moving ahead unless he heard otherwise from the Secretary.

25X1



*Presup.
Haw.*

**THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 688-81/1
10 February 1981

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment 25X1

FROM:
Special Assistant for Nuclear
Proliferation Intelligence

The attached memo for the record about the transition team's report on US non-proliferation policy is forwarded, FYI. 25X1

cc: Chrmn, NIC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 688-81
9 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Transition Team Recommendations for Changes in
US Non-Proliferation Policy

1. In the transition team's report* there is the recognition that the spread of nuclear explosives is one of the greatest challenges facing the US in the 1980s and beyond. The team concludes that the US should:

- restore its credibility and reliability as a nuclear supplier
- treat proliferation primarily as a security problem
- vigorously increase its nonproliferation efforts (denial of US nuclear supply) regarding nations where a potential for acquisition of nuclear explosives is a risk to US security interests
- disavow attempts to thwart reprocessing in industrialized nations.

2. Regarding organizational changes, the team recommends that

- the responsibility for issuing export licenses should be transferred from the NRC to the State Department
- a bureau should be established at State with the sole responsibility for nuclear affairs; the bureau should be headed by an Assistant Secretary.

25X1

*A six-page unclassified summary made available by State/INR




CONFIDENTIAL

NFAC 688-81

SUBJECT: Transition Team Recommendation for Changes in
US Non-Proliferation Policy

3. Comments: There is no mention in the report of intelligence activities and arrangements. If the recommended organizational changes are implemented a) the requirement for periodic intelligence briefings for the NRC Commissioners is likely to lapse, and b) the leadership of the new bureau should be consulted early on concerning its intelligence needs and priorities.



25X1

Deputy Special Assistant
for
Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NFAC 688-81

Distribution:

- 1 - DD/NFA
- 1 - Chrmn, NIC
- 1 - NFAC Registry
- 2 - SA/NPI

CONFIDENTIAL